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THE LAND USE PLANNING ACT-AN IDEA WE CAN 
DO WITHOUT 
By John McClaughry* 
On June 11, 1974 the House of Representatives, by a paper thin 
211-204 vote, refused to adopt a rule to permit consideration of the 
Land Use Planning Act (LUPA) of 1974.1 The vote was the signal 
for an outpouring of lamentation from leading national newspapers2 
and the more ardent sponsors ofland use legislation.3 Congressman 
Morris Udall (D-Ariz.) vowed to carry the fight to the 94th Con-
gress, 4 and the measure will undoubtedly be one of the most contro-
versial to come before that assembly. 
The major features of the bill itself have been adequately and 
enthusiastically described in this journal.5 The purpose of this arti-
cle is fourfold: to present a highly condensed critique of the main 
thrust of the bill, without dissecting it section by section; to explore 
the workings of a "comprehensive land use planning process" in 
practice, as illustrated by the Vermont experience;8 to describe a 
number of alternative approaches to land use guidance that avoid 
the use of the police power (either altogether, or without appropriate 
compensation to land-owners); and to suggest the outlines of a Fed-
eral approach to the question that would eliminate the most dis-
turbing features of the LUP A. 
I. NATIONAL LAND USE PLANNING LEGISLATION 
After three years of tentative beginnings and false starts/ the 
Senate in 1973 passed and sent to the House a major "Land Use 
Planning and Policy Assistance Act", S. 268, sponsored by Senator 
Henry Jackson (D-Washington).8 On September 13, 1973, Repre-
sentative Morris K. Udall (D-Arizona) and 14 co-sponsors intro-
duced a very similar companion measure, H.R. 10294. This bill was 
reported by a 26-11 vote of the House Interior and Insular Affairs 
Committee on February 13, 1974.9 
Much to the consternation of the bill's backers, the House Rules 
Committee on February 26 voted 9-4 to postpone indefinitely a rule 
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for debate of the measure. IO To mollify critics who opposed consider-
ation of the bill on the grounds that no public hearings had ever 
been held on it, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee's Sub-
committee on the Environment, chaired by Representative Udall, 
held three days of hearings in Washington on Apri123, 24, and 26. 11 
Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of witnesses testify-
ing at those hearings urged rejection of the bill, or at the very least 
a prolonged round of field hearings across the country, not one word 
of the bill was changed.12 
After considerable backstage maneuvering, the Rules Committee, 
by a vote of 8-7, agreed on May 15 to recommend a rule to the 
House.13 The rule was the subject of heated debate on June 11, 
resulting in its rejection by the aforementioned 211-204 vote. 14 While 
admitting that this vote had ended action on the measure in 1974, 
Representative Udall soon thereafter introduced a "clean bill" in-
corporating some 21 amendments he had intended to offer on the 
House floor, and promised to bring the bill to an early vote in the 
94th Congress. IS 
The rationale for the Land Use Planning Act was that "the pres-
ent State and local institutional arrangements for planning and 
regulating land use of more than local impact often are inadequate 
... "18 The unhappy results of this inadequacy were summarized in 
11 additional paragraphs. 
Following this list of calamities is a sweeping declaration of Con-
gressional policy: 
Sec. 102. The Congress declares that it is the policy of the Federal 
Government, in cooperation with the several States and their political 
subdivisions and other concerned public and private organizations, to 
use all practicable means to-
(a) assure that the lands in the Nation are used in ways that create 
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony and under which the environmental, social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans can be met; and 
(b) encourage and support the establishment by the States of effec-
tive land use planning and decision-making processes that assure 
informed consideration, in advance, of the environmental, social, and 
economic implications of major decisions as to use of the Nation's 
land and that provide for public education and involvement in such 
processes. 17 
In support of the policy, the Secretary of the Interior was author-
ized to make grants to participating states totalling $800 million 
over a period of eight years.18 To qualify for a grant, a state would 
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be required to establish a land use planning agency and an intergov-
ernmental advisory councilY The agency was to initiate a "compre-
hensive land use planning process" which, despite a host of carefully 
chosen non-toxic verbs, constituted a statewide land use control 
program.20 To carry out this "process" and thereby qualify for the 
carrot of federal aid, States were required to use either direct State 
land use planning and regulation, or local government action ap-
proved by the State, or both.21 
The State was also required to regulate areas it designated as 
"areas of critical environmental concern";22 areas "which are, or 
may be, impacted by key facilities";23 areas "presently or poten-
tially subject to development and land use of regional benefit" ;24 
etc. To continue to receive Federal funds after the first three years, 
the State would have to satisfy the Secretary of the Interior that it 
had not excluded any "areas of critical environmental concern 
which the Secretary had determined to be of more than statewide 
significance. "25 
Since these "areas of critical environmental concern" invited in-
struction from the Secretary of the Interior, the definition became 
particularly important. To begin with, such areas were defined to 
be "fragile or historic lands", 26 "natural hazard lands", 27 and "re-
newable resource lands" .28 Then, to catch whatever had eluded the 
contemplation of the draftsman, the definition concluded with a 
fourth category:29 "(4) such additional lands as are determined to 
be of critical environmental concern." 
A bill of such sweeping scope and importance naturally inspired 
strong opposition. Besides the relatively minor disputes involving 
technical language and administrative procedures, the main prob-
lems with the bill were two. First, the bill would for the first time 
inject the Federal government into the implementation of land use 
planning decisions, heretofore virtually the exclusive province of 
state and local governments.30 Second, the bill would ensure the 
creation of new institutions of government at the state level, 
strongly influenced by Washington, whose success could be assured 
only if they moved to seize complete control over the use and ex-
change of land. 
Nevertheless, backers of the bill went to absurd lengths to disa-
vow any intention of imposing Federal land use controls. Senator 
Henry Jackson, chief personage behind passage of the Senate ver-
sion of LUPA, declared that "the Land Use Policy and Planning 
Assistance Act is the Nation's last chance to preserve and to invigor-
ate local land use decisionmaking and to insure that basic property 
rights are not infringed by bureaucrats in places as far removed as 
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Washington, D.C."31 Yet, despite this impassioned if not wholly 
accurate rhetoric, the bill clearly included Federal controls. Perhaps 
the most explicit example was the requirement that to continue to 
receive Federal funds after the first three years, a state had to regu-
late "areas of critical environmental concern of more than statewide 
significance", such areas to be designated by the Secretary of the 
Interior.32 But even if such explicit provisions for Federal control 
were deleted (and this one was deleted in Representative Udall's 
subsequent bill33), anyone experienced in the workings of Federal-
state grant programs could not fail to recognize that the Washington 
officials who control the purse strings call the tune. The state offi-
cials administering the "process" would necessarily be highly recep-
tive to "suggestions" emanating from the Interior Department, 
which also supplied the funds for their salaries. 
This "institution first, directives later" approach was specifically 
endorsed in 1973 by William Reilly, then Executive Director of the 
Laurence Rockefeller-financed Task Force on Land Use and Urban 
Growth. Labelling the incorporation of substantive Federal direc-
tives into the legislation at the beginning as a tactical mistake, 
Reilly said: 
The essential objective in the field of land use is institutional reform 
... Once states have established land use planning and regulatory 
processes along the lines likely to be required by the Federal law, it may 
be more appropriate to consider specific substantive directives aimed at 
preventing irresistible destruction of environmental values.34 
Another strong advocate of the national legislation, Catholic Uni-
versity Law Professor G. Graham Waite, noting the advantages of 
a Federal bill that invited the states to undertake land use regula-
tion on their own, observed: 
It reduces expansion of the Federal Bureaucracy. It preserves the 
appearance of state power in the planning field and thus may reduce 
political opposition to national land use planning.311 (emphasis added) 
Reassurances from LUPA's proponents that no Federal control of 
land use decisions would ultimately transpire under LUPA were also 
far from convincing in view of the ardent espousal by the same 
persons of "crossover sanctions, "38 a system of severe economic pen-
alization of States for failure to comply with LUPA. Under any 
Federal-State grant program, failure by the state to comply with 
Federal rules and regulations necessarily results in termination of 
the Federal assistance for that particular program. In addition, no 
State is required to take part in a Federal-State grant program-it 
is the state's voluntary choice whether to participate or not. 
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By contrast, the "crossover sanctions" in the national land use 
bill's provision went considerably further.37 If, after three years 
from the date of enactment, states had not chosen to participate in 
the program, i.e., had refused the Federal carrot, they would be 
treated to the Federal stick: a loss of funds to which the states were 
entitled under three completely separate programs-the Airport 
and Airway Development Act, Federal-aid highway assistance, and 
Land and Water Conservation ·Fund payments.38 Though this un-
precedented provision was defeated on the Senate floor39 and de-
leted by the House Environment Subcommittee during markup of 
the House bill,40 it gave clear notice to all that the intent of the 
backers of the act was to eventually use every possible lever to force 
the States to undertake the "comprehensive land use planning pro-
cess". Opponents of the act could hardly be blamed for suspecting 
that these same backers had quite a few more ideas of the same 
nature in mind. 
The second major objection to LUPA dealt with the creation of 
new institutions in state government, spawned and nursed by Fed-
eral money, which could achieve their lofty purposes (if at all) only 
by seizing more and more control over the property rights of individ-
ual citizens. As Representative Steve Symms (R-Idaho) put it: 
This innocent sounding bill will necessarily create, throughout all these 
fifty states, well funded, well-staffed agencies of the government. These 
agencies, to succeed in their mission, must centralize power over prop-
erty in their own hands. . . . Each of these agencies will have a guiding 
testament-a statement of objectives reciting the lofty aims of society. 
Each of these agencies will necessarily be staffed by planners, experts, 
and lawyers entrusted with the achievement of these lofty objectives. 
They will be lavishly fueled with the taxpayer's money. They will have 
their own expert ideas of how society can be changed to make those 
objectives a reality .... [T]he state land use agencies created and 
fattened under this legislation can succeed only by invading the legiti-
mate rights of private property owners ... 41 
This system would inevitably lead to a "New Feudalism"42 where 
the freehold theory of property ownership would be transformed into 
a "social property" theory. The State-in the last analysis, the Fed-
eral Government-would accede to the rights of the medieval king. 
Land would no longer be "owned" by private citizens but merely 
"held" for a superior,43 
The "free and common socage" so laboriously extracted from feu-
dal tenures centuries ago would give way to a modernized tenure: 
all use and hence all exchange of land would be allowed by the State 
only when the use or exchange did not injure the public interest, as 
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determined by officials employed by the State. 
Most backers of the freehold theory do not, incidentally, sub-
scribe to Blackstone's famous dictum that: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages 
the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual 
in the universe.44 
Freehold property theory includes ancient limitations. One may 
not waste and destroy his property; one may not use his property 
so as to injure that of another; one has no right to enjoy services 
provided by the public on his own terms. But, with these not insig-
nificant limitations, a wide distribution of freehold property was 
considered indispensable to the creation of a free republic by the 
Founding Fathers.45 It was transparently plain to such men as John 
Adams,46 Thomas Jefferson,47 James Madison,48 and Daniel Web-
ster49 that the radical idea of liberty and republican self government 
rested upon a premise of widespread private property ownership 
under the personal and responsible control of a multitude of owners. 
If the State were to confiscate the right to use and the right to 
exchange, the owner would have little left but the power to exclude. 
The power to undertake any economic activity requiring land would 
be vested in the State, as in the present day Communist countries.50 
Would creation of a "comprehensive land use planning process" 
in a state lead to such a result? To determine that question, it is 
instructive to examine the experience in Vermont, a state whose 
environmental control law has been hailed by land use control advo-
cates as a progressive model for the nation. 
II. THE VERMONT EXPERIENCE 
Throughout the decade of the Sixties Vermont became a haven 
for urban expatriates, second home buyers, tourists and skiers from 
Boston and New York City, who, with the aid of newly constructed 
interstate highways, were only a short drive away. Vermont's real 
estate and construction market naturally responded to this influx 
of new people with money to spend. Vacation home developments 
sprang up like mushrooms, some of them hardly more substantial. 
Southern Vermont, closest to the urban population centers, expe-
rienced the building boom first. Plans for large new vacation home 
developments were announced almost daily. Alarmed by sensa-
tional newspaper accounts, Governor Deane C. Davis launched an 
investigation. It revealed numerous homes of shoddy construction, 
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with defective sewage systems, accessible only by steep, winding, 
thinly-gravelled roads unlikely to survive a Vermont winter. Though 
local towns in Vermont had plenty of legal authority to deal with 
the sewage and road problems,51 these problems were unfamiliar and 
the town officials unsophisticated. 
Instead of mapping out a program to equip local towns and local 
citizen groups with the tools to deal with these problems, all of 
which were highly amenable to locally-designed solutions within the 
freehold property context, Governor Davis appointed a commission 
under then Representative Arthur Gibb to produce a state land use 
control program. 
The outcome of the work of the Governor's Commission on Envi-
ronmental Control (a pregnant title, as it turned out) was H. 417 of 
1970. This bill, passed by large majorities in both House and Senate, 
became Act 250.52 
The act had three major stages for implementation. First was the 
creation of a nine member State Environmental Board, and three-
member District Environmental Commissions, to administer a sys-
tem of development permits.53 Generally, a permit was required for 
any "development" consisting of more than ten units of housing; 
industrial development on more than ten acres of land (one acre in 
unzoned towns); and any development above the 2500 foot alti-
tude. 54 
To obtain a permit, a developer had to prove to the District Envi-
ronmental Commission (and to the Environmental Board, on ap-
peal) that his project: would not result in undue water or air pollu-
tion; had sufficient water available; would not cause unreasonable 
soil erosion, highway congestion, or municipal service and educa-
tional burden; would not have an undue adverse effect on scenic or 
natural beauty, aesthetics, historic sites, or rare and irreplaceable 
natural areas; conformed to all local or regional plans; and con-
formed to any subsequently adopted land capability or land use 
plan.55 
The second part of the "comprehensive land use planning pro-
cess" was the preparation of a "land capability and development 
plan", defined in one inclusive and breathtaking sentence as: 
a capability and development plan consistent with the interim land 
capability plan which shall be made with the general purpose of guiding 
and accomplishing a coordinated, efficient and economic development 
of the state, which will, in accordance with present and future needs and 
resources, best promote the health, safety, order, convenience, prosper-
ity and welfare of the inhabitants, as well as efficiency and economy in 
the process of development, including but not limited to, such distribu-
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tion of population and of the uses of the land for urbanization, trade, 
industry, habitation, recreation, agriculture, forestry and other uses as 
will tend to create conditions favorable to transportation, health, safety, 
civic activities and educational and cultural opportunities, reduce the 
wastes of financial and human resources which result from either exces-
sive congestion or excessive scattering of population and tend toward an 
efficient and economic utilization of drainage, sanitary and other facili-
ties and resources and the conservation and production of the supply of 
food, water and minerals. 56 
Following this monumental achievement was to be the land use 
plan: 
based on the capability and development plan which shall consist of a 
map and statements of present and prospective land uses based on the 
capability and development plan, which determine in broad categories 
the proper use of the lands in the state whether for forestry, recreation, 
agriculture or urban purposes, the plans to be further implemented at 
the local level by authorized land use control such as subdivision regula-
tions and zoning.57 
It was this "land use plan" that threatened to be the undoing of 
the whole Vermont scheme for land use controls. 
The implementation of the development permit process began in 
1970. From the beginning, not surprisingly, it suffered from consid-
erable confusion, delays, and irrationalities as untrained laymen on 
the district environmental commissions struggled to cope with ap-
plications exceeding their technical grasp. The commissions had 
little or no guidelines to follow other than the bare bones of the law 
itself-no administrative precedents or case law, and very little 
technical assistance. In addition, the Health Department Subdivi-
sion Regulations, adopted as a so-called "emergency" measure in 
the fall of 1969 and ratified ex post facto by the 1970 legislature, 
overlapped the field and caused additional confusion.58 Other state 
laws regulating public buildings and water and air pollution, plus 
town zoning and building codes, aggravated the situation. Though 
Act 250 applied only to the so-called "larger developments", frustra-
tion and occasionally outrage began to percolate through the body 
politic. 
Following the 1972 elections, in which Act 250 and its administra-
tion had not yet become a major issue, the Environmental Board 
made public its drafts for the "capability and development plan" 
and the "land use plan", which were intended for legislative ap-
proval in 1973. Environmental organizations were dismayed at the 
quality of the work, and apprehensive at the expected reaction. In 
this, they were not wrong. 
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The plans were exposed to public hearings, as required by the law, 
in the waning months of 1972, and were generally shelled from all 
directions. The land use plan was immediately withdrawn when 
neither outgoing Governor Davis nor his successor, Governor 
Thomas P. Salmon, would sign it for transmittal to the legislature.59 
The capability and development plan, in a baffling series of ver-
sions, worked its tortuous route through the General Assembly to 
pass on the final day of the session.60 The result, however, bore little 
resemblance either to the description in the law or to the hopes of 
the environmentalists. Far from being the plan described in the 
statute, the "plan" was only a series of "principles", followed by a 
number of clarifying amendments to the permit criteria of Act 250. 
Meanwhile, the Board was hard at work on its land use plan 
which, as it turned out, was statewide zoning pure and simple. In 
this the Board faced a serious problem. The original act had defined 
"development" in a way as to exclude up to nine units of housing 
at one location, and subdivisions of less than ten lots. Clearly, if 
there was to be a serious comprehensive plan to achieve all the goals 
cited in the lofty language of the act, it would not do to have free 
individuals constructing nine unit-or even one unit-develop-
ments anywhere that local zoning allowed. The thought of even this 
much unfettered landowner discretion was more than any self-
respecting planner could bear. 
So in October, 1972, the Environmental Board adopted a resolu-
tion asking the legislature to lower the definition of "development" 
to include even one housing unit and even the surveying of lot lines 
on one lot! This proposition met a chilly response in the 1973legisla-
ture. Instead of broadening the definition of "development", the 
legislature inserted, in the definition of "land use plan" quoted 
above, this additional sentence: 
The land use plan shall not be construed to govern the construction of 
improvements or the subdivision of land unless such activities fall 
within the definition of 'development' and 'subdivision' under section 
6001 of this chapter,61 
This new language threw the Environmental Board into dismay, 
even as they celebrated the narrow passage of the much transformed 
"capability and development plan". Charged with preparing a 
statewide zoning plan, they realized that no sound statewide zoning 
plan would make sense if any individual could build nine houses 
anywhere he chose, local zoning permitting. 
The Board, after considerable discussion, arrived at the conclu-
sion that the law must be either ignored or overridden, since the 
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legislature had refused to change it. The Board's plan therefore 
included a new category of "subdivision and development", namely, 
"any subdivision or development, not now defined in section 6001 
of Title 10"62 (emphasis supplied). Thus, notwithstanding the ex-
plicit legislative prohibition against making the land use plan appl-
i<;able to "small developments", the Environmental Board moved 
once again to seize control, one way or another, over every single lot 
in the state. 
The Board's response to another provision of the law governing 
the preparation of the land use plan is also instructive. The law 
required that the land use plan "shall consist of a map" which shall 
"determine in broad categories the proper use of the lands in the 
state ... "63 The opposition that appeared upon unveiling the 
Board's first, broad-brush map in November, 1972 had made the 
Board wary. In open session, the Board debated the wisdom of 
complying with the law in this regard, as the 1973 unveiling ap-
proached.64 The Board decided, finally, to present a text without a 
map, notwithstanding the explicit requirement of the law that the 
plan "shall consist of a map". Two Orange County farmers, and 
later several town planning commissions, brought civil suits against 
the Board, seeking mandamus directing the Board to comply with 
the map requirement. 65 The notoriety produced by the Board's re-
fusal to produce the required map, accentuated by the filing of the 
law suits, caused legislative leaders to insist on the map to accom-
pany the text of the plan. Then, in great haste, the Board asked the 
State Planning Office to prepare comprehensive state zoning maps 
within four weeks, a truly herculean task. When the maps finally 
appeared, in mid-February, 1974, the full import of the land use 
scheme sank home, and at a stormy public hearing on February 26, 
the plan was trampled to death. The legislature subsequently cre-
ated a land use study commission to pursue the matter, and implic-
itly stripped the Environmental Board of any further responsibility 
for developing a land use plan for the State.66 
The foregoing is not intended to be an authoritative or exhaustive 
study of Vermont's Act 250 in operation.67 It is narrated merely to 
illustrate the basic point urged by those apprehensive about the 
effect of the national land use planning bills. The Vermont experi-
ence suggests that a well financed bureaucracy of experts and plan-
ners, given' a sweeping mandate to produce coordinated, efficient 
and economic development, safety, order, convenience, prosperity, 
welfare, etc., must inevitably attempt to seize control over those 
activities falling beyond their legal mandate by whatever legal han-
dle may be available, or by disregard of the law if necessary. The 
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Vermont experience demonstrates that the danger prophesied by 
opponents to the land use planning bills is far from fanciful. 
III. ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR GUIDING LAND USE 
It is conceivable, at least arguably, that the land use institutions 
established under a Federal-aid program would move in a direction 
other than invasion of property rights through the imposition of land 
use controls. It is not possible, however, under the Land Use Plan-
ning Act considered by the House. That act and its legislative his-
tory are replete with direct instructions to the States. Those instruc-
tions demand control and regulation by the State, if the State is to 
continue to qualify for Federal funds under the act. For instance, 
in implementing the "planning process" (i.e., control program) in 
"areas of critical environmental concern", the States are required 
to "control the use of land" around "key facilities",88 "control pro-
posed large scale development",89 and "consider the environmental, 
economic and social impact of large scale subdivision or develop-
ment projects". 70 (Inasmuch as the original bill used the term "regu-
late" in place of the euphemism "consider" in this last paragraph, 
the intent of the sponsors is perfectly clear.?) 
The bill did include a section noting that "nothing in this title 
shall be deemed to prevent a state land use planning agency from 
adopting a land use control plan [n.b.] that uses methods other 
than zoning .... ",72 but it does not allow land use guidance plans 
that use methods other than control. As for property rights, the bill 
includes only a meaningless observation that "nothing in the act 
shall be deemed to enhance or diminish the rights of owners of 
property as provided by the Constitution of the United States"73-as 
if Constitutional rights might be removed by statutory action. 
Are there alternatives to the program of state controls over private 
property that would almost inevitably flow from implementation of 
the Land Use Planning Act by the States? The reader who escapes 
the clutches of the state control and social property advocates can, 
with but modest effort, uncover a host of creative alternatives to 
uncompensated direct state land use controls over private property. 
It should not be presumed that these techniques are laissez-faire in 
nature on an absolute scale. They are not. All free market activity 
must, in any but a theoretical society, operate in some context 
which includes the law of property, eminent domain, taxation, and 
governmental activity of many kinds. Insofar as these activities 
impinge on the theoretical free market system, they are coercive. 
But the techniques to be discussed here avoid, in every case, the use 
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of the coercive power of the state to confiscate the property rights 
of landowners pursuing innocent enjoyment of their property, with-
out at the very least requiring the general public to give something 
of value to the landowner for his coerced cooperation-something of 
economic value, in addition to whatever warm rosy glow may result 
from his giving up his rights in land for the benefit of the public. 
The discussion is decidedly heuristic; readers must consult the ref-
erences cited for a more detailed treatment in each case. 
A. Individual Action Techniques 
In a densely populated society some land use conflicts are inevita-
ble. In recent years there has been a strong movement to deal with 
the increasing number and severity of such conflicts through the 
imposition of public controls, most notably planning and zoning. 
This movement has been based on the philosophy that it is incon-
venient, inefficient, and even undesirable for individuals and groups 
of individuals to attempt to deal with land use conflicts on their 
own; the decision making and regulation should be imposed collec-
tively by the government. Satisfaction with the results of increased 
planning and zoning has, however, become almost as rare as a Black 
Panther at a Klan meeting. The search for new and decentralized 
techniques has thus begun. 
Professor Joseph Sax of the University of Michigan Law School 
has been prominent in expanding the field of legal action to protect 
against environmental offenses.74 Disenchanted with the ineffi-
ciency and impenetrability of public regulatory processes designed 
to protect the environment, Sax developed "a strategy for citizen 
action" based on direct citizen litigation.75 The key sentence in 
Sax's model legislation, which has been enacted in the State of 
Michigan, is: 
Sec. 2.(1) The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, 
any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision 
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization 
or other legal entity may maintain an action in the circuit court having 
jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for 
declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political subdivi-
sion thereof, any instrumentality thereof, any person, partnership, cor-
poration, association, organization or other legal entity for the protec-
tion of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust 
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.71 
The Sax approach imposes upon the court the responsibility of 
identifying or devising some standard of performance to guide a 
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determination in each case. Where performance standards exist in 
legislation, this may not be a difficult task, but in many cases the 
judge will be forced to break a path through the wilderness. In 
addition, by allowing any person to bring the action, the Sax bill 
opens the door to professional public trust protectors whose abstract 
concern for the environment may give little weight to the concerns 
of local communities and the wishes of their prople. For example, 
the Sierra Club might well wish to bring an action to stop discharge 
of paper mill wastes into a remote lake, with no concern for the 
economic well-being of the people in the community who would 
necessarily balance a clean environment against the threat of mas-
sive unemployment.n 
Professor Allison Dunham of the University of Chicago Law 
School sees considerable potential in enforcement of planning deci-
sions by reducing marketability of a landowner's product through 
"(A) threatening the income forthcoming from the property; (B) 
making it difficult to adhere to established management and mar-
keting practices; and (C) rendering the title defective so that buyers 
and lenders will not or cannot purchase an interest in his commod-
ity."78 For example, a tenant can be relieved from paying rent if the 
landlord's certificate of occupancy is revoked for housing code or 
other violations. Violations can be made to trigger clauses in insur-
ance policies and mortgages producing unpleasant results for the 
violator. Recordation of subdivision plans can be denied, forcing a 
land developer to describe his lots in the inconvenient metes and 
bounds manner, which is not appreciated by real estate marketing 
and financial institutions. Most important, Dunham envisions title 
encumbrances flowing from ordinance violations, such as a senior 
lien imposed by a city government for improvements made by the 
city on private property.79 
Dunham's proposal operates within the context of collective zon-
ing and ordinances. Yet the techniques discussed could as easily be 
applied to a decentralized, "privatized" system. Dunham also an-
ticipates Sax's proposal for direct action by individuals to enforce 
planning decisions against non-complying neighbors, and actions 
seeking mandamus against public officials who have ignored en-
forcement of such ordinances. 
A comprehensive and conceptually sound approach to a decen-
tralized, privatized system has now been offered in a masterful arti-
cle by Professor Robert C. Ellickson of the University of Southern 
Calkornia Law Schoo1.80 His one hundred page article entitled "Al-
ternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as 
Land Use Controls" lays the groundwork for a reform of the legal 
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system to permit individuals to resolve land use disputes in accord-
ance with clear and workable principles. 
Ellickson discusses the economic concepts underlying land use 
conflicts. He points out that an economic solution to such conflicts 
should minimize the sum of nuisance costs, prevention costs, and 
administrative costs. Upon analysis, Ellickson finds very little to 
recommend currently practiced zoning programs. "In the United 
States", he says, "zoning generally works to the detriment of the 
poor and near poor, racial minorities and renters; it operates for the 
benefit of the well-to-do, particularly homeowners, by artificially 
increasing the supply of sites on the market usable for only expen-
sive homes and thus reducing their cost. "81 
Ellickson then offers a reformulation of nuisance law to place the 
risk of loss from external harms on the landowner carrying out the 
damaging activity. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case 
of nuisance involving substantial harm to him-when an activity is 
deemed "unneighborly" by contemporary community stan-
dards-he will seek judicial relief. The court may decide under one 
of four rules: 
1. Injunctive relief; 
2. Damages to plaintiff, but no injunctive relief; 
3. Neither damages nor injunctive relief (judgment for defendant); 
4. Injunctive relief, with compensation to the defendant. 
Where injuries are pervasive but individually insubstantial, and 
where a reasonably stable objective index of noxiousness exists,82 a 
public body would assess fines to internalize the costs to the public 
generally.83 Where such an index does not exist, mandatory stan-
dards would be applied. The collective aspect of the system would 
be implemented through Nuisance Boards combining rule making, 
administrative and adjudicatory functions within the guidelines of 
state law. 
The foregoing brief discussion does little justice to the breadth 
and depth of Ellickson's proposal. It would clearly take a very deter-
mined and farsighted effort by bar associations and other organiza-
tions to install Ellickson's nuisance system in state law. That effort 
will probably not come until it becomes apparent even to the casual 
observer that the current trend toward more and higher level zoning 
is totally misdirected and, in fact, destructive of many of the ends 
it seeks. 
In connection with Ellickson's approach, the use of mediation and 
arbitration to cope with environmental and land use disputes is still 
in its infancy.84 The Center for Dispute Settlement of the American 
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Arbitration Association has recently begun to participate in a grow-
ing number of mediation and arbitration cases involving such dis-
putes.85 Development of model arbitration rules in various kinds of 
disputes-something that could easily be based upon the Ellickson 
proposal-would be a useful advance in this direction. 
B. Mutual Defense 
Covenants have long been used as a private voluntary means of 
land use control. This is essentially a private zoning plan voluntarily 
agreed to by all affected landowners. It is most commonly estab-
lished by a subdivision developer prior to selling lots on the market, 
since he has complete ownership of all parcels at that point. It can, 
however, be established among numerous individually owned par-
cels, although the transaction costs are much higher and unanimity 
is usually required if the plan is to be effective. 
Bernard Siegan has authoritatively described the workings of a 
covenant system in the nation's largest unzoned city, Houston, 
Texas.8o After a detailed and exhaustive study of real estate patterns 
in Houston and comparison with similar cities which have zoning 
(e.g., Dallas), Siegan can find absolutely nothing favorable to say 
about municipal zoning. Through a covenant approach, buttressed 
with some general performance ordinances to govern nuisances, Sie-
gan believes free market forces would do a far better job of shaping 
land use than the inevitably political activity of centralized land 
controls. 
Building upon Siegan's definitive work, lawyers at the University 
of Southern California Law School have developed an institution-
alized covenant system which has the effect of shifting to the public 
the costs of creating and enforcing a private covenant systemY 
Thus, for example, whenever a land owner undertook a land use 
which violated the covenant governing his land, any affected person 
could bring a quick, effective action for restraint of the offender. The 
system, in effect, rationalizes what grew up almost accidentally in 
Houston, and provides public mechanisms for efficient citizen en-
forcement. 
Finally, petition zoning should at least be mentioned, although it 
does represent coercion of a minority of landowners by the major-
ity.88 Under petition zoning, landowners owning (say) two thirds of 
the assessed valuation of property in a self-defined district may 
petition local government to exercise its police power to impose a 
very simplified, highly localized zoning plan in their neighborhood. 
This is not, strictly speaking, within the purview of this article since 
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it does involve direct coercion of dissenting landowners. In its decen-
tralized and simplified nature, however, it is probably preferable to 
zoning schemes determined and enforced by distant governments 
and their bureaucrats. 
C. Compensated Regulation 
Where Ellickson suggests an injunction with compensation to the 
person enjoined as a promising avenue of la'nd use guidance, Chi-
cago attorney Fred Bosselmann has offered much the same idea 
with regard to public regulation. s9 Under his plan, instead of the 
state either taking property under eminent domain with compensa-
tion, or posing restrictions on privately held property which may 
virtually destroy its value, the state would impose regulation and 
pay the landowner for the value of his land extinguished by the 
regulation. 
Legally speaking, the state would pay damages for reducing the 
value of land beyond a certain point. The state would not have to 
take the property, as in eminent domain, but it would periodically 
compensate the landowner who is forced to forego certain activities 
in the public interest. This device avoids the present dilemma of 
zoning cases, where an either-or situation obtained: either the ordi-
nance is upheld, and the plaintiff forced to absorb the loss; or the 
ordinance is declared to be invalid as regards plaintiff's property, 
and he is' free to embark on his desired use, the public interest 
notwithstanding. While Bosselmann's plan is coercive in forcing a 
landowner to do certain things against his will, the plan at least 
recognizes the justice of payment by the state for what it takes in 
the name of the public. 
A far more detailed proposal along the same lines has been offered 
by University of Pennsylvania Law Professors Jan Z. Krasnowiecki 
and James C. N. Pau1.90 Under their plan, the land in question is 
first valued as in an eminent domain proceeding. The state or local 
government guarantees this value to the landowner. Then zoning-
type regulations are applied to guide the future use of the land. 
If these use regulations prohibit an existing use, the owner may 
draw upon his guarantee for damages. If they prohibit a possible 
future development use, the owner may ask for a government-
supervised sale of his property. If the proceeds of the sale are less 
than the guaranteed value, the government makes up the difference. 
The guaranteed value includes an escalation clause to account for 
inflation in the value of the dollar (but not inflation of local real 
estate prices). 
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The owner thus receives a guarantee of his parcel's value as of the 
date the restrictions were first imposed. The guarantee lasts as long 
as the controls continue. It is protection against loss of value due 
both to regulation and to a possible depression in real estate prices. 
D. Public Acauisition of Rights 
Public ownership has long been a feature of American life, from 
the days of the Puritans onward.Dr There are few who would argue 
that the public has no business acquiring certain interests in real 
estate, although a lively debate exists about how far public owner-
ship should be extended. In our time, William H. Whyte has been 
a most influential voice for the public acquisition of easements or 
interests less than fee simple to preserve natural scenery and re-
sources.D2 In acquiring easements, of course, the state must either 
make an offer acceptable to the landowner, or initiate eminent do-
main involving compensation and, usually, a jury trial on its 
amount. Various tax benefits-such as deductibility of the ease-
ment value as a charitable contribution to the governmental 
bodyD3-add incentive to landowners to donate easements or make 
a donative sale at a reduced price. The Nature Conservancy, a pri-
vate organization, has developed donation techniques to a fine 
point.D4 
An interesting example of public acquisition has occurred in the 
small town of St. George, Vermont. There, the voters voted in town 
meeting to buy a choice 48-acre parcel at the town's only crossroads. 
A local bank advanced the funds on a short term note based only 
on the town's promise to repay. The town then sponsored an archi-
tectural contest to design the most suitable town center to occupy 
the property, in which nine architectural firms participated. Armed 
with a winning concept, the town is now prepared to deal with any 
developer who wishes to undertake the venture, possibly even as a 
joint venturer with the town itself. In a move of doubtful legality, 
the town also zoned adjacent parcels noncommercial, to create for 
the town government a monopoly in commercial land. To date the 
town has not been deemed ripe for construction of the town center, 
but the existence of Interstate 89 just four miles away, and the 
expansion of the Burlington metropolitan area to within eight miles 
of the town, indicate that St. George will be developed within the 
decade. A similar program is reportedly underway in the coastal 
village of Georgetown, Maine. In Georgetown's 1972 town meeting, 
the voters overwhelmingly rejected town zoning-but agreed to per-
mit the town to buy up fifty of the town's waterfront acres for future 
development. 95 
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The idea of the community land trust also deserves attention. It 
has been defined as "a legal entity, a quasi-public body, chartered 
to hold land in stewardship for all mankind present and future while 
protecting the legitimate use rights of its residents. "96 While at first 
glance that definition appears to embody the "social property" con-
cept which won such poor reviews earlier in this article, it must be 
noted that the community land trust is necessarily based on volun-
tary acquisition of land from private freehold owners. Indeed, one 
of the privileges of freehold ownership is to establish a trust over 
land for the benefit of named and unnamed beneficiaries. One does 
not have to embrace Ralph Borsodi's concept of "trusterty" as an 
alternative to "property" to accept the community land trust as a 
useful non-coercive technique for guiding land use. 97 
Under a typical land trust, the trust agreement spells out in gen-
eral terms the allowable uses of the land, and charges the trustees 
with administration. The trust-owned land is customarily leased to 
tenants (frequently homesteaders in rural areas) on a long term 
basis, subject to certain restrictions on use and an obligation to pay 
a stated amount to cover property taxes and other essential costs. 
A land trust can as easily be created to allow commercial and in-
dustrial uses. 98 
The concept of the land trust can be applied to public bodies as 
well as those created by private individuals. 99 A public land trust 
would acquire land and rights in land through open market pur-
chase or lease or possibly through eminent domain. It would in turn 
lease such land back to those performing appropriate activities on 
it, commonly farming. By removing the possibility of development, 
the value of the land would be lowered and the property tax burden 
would be reduced on the tenant. The trust could also lease the 
development rights from, say, an operating farmer. During the pe-
riod of the lease, the farmer would pay local property taxes only on 
the value of the land for agricultural purposes, while the trust would 
pay to the local government the taxes on the trust-held development 
rights. If the farmer wished to re-acquire the development rights at 
some later time, he would be required either to pay a roll-back price 
equivalent to the cumulative value of the tax benefits enjoyed, or 
to share any appreciation in the value of the development rights 
with the trust.IOO 
Land trusts are in operation in Prince Edward Islandlol and Sas-
katchewan,lo2 Canada, and one has been proposed by the North 
Dakota Farmers Union. loa The legislature of Suffolk County, Long 
Island, New York has appropriated $45 million in its 1974-76 capital 
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program to enable it to acquire interests in 9,000 acres of farmland 
threatened by urban development. 104 
One further example of public acquisition of rights-in this case 
an unwilling acquisition-should be noted. The imposition of land 
use controls necessarily diminishes the value of private land by 
restricting its use, and hence its exchange potential. Current case 
law gives little clear guidance in takings cases, inasmuch as every 
case is arguably distinguishable, and a host of precedents can be 
construed to support the positions of both parties to the action. 
To clarify this situation, the author has proposed a very simple 
inverse condemnation statute: 
Whenever implementation of a state or local land use planning and 
regulatory program restricts the use or exchange value of land so as to 
reduce its fair market value to less than fifty percent of its unrestricted 
fair market value, the owner of such land shall have the right to invoke 
condemnation by the government imposing the restrictions, or to receive 
appropriate compensation from that government, and in either case to 
have compensation determined, at his request, by a jury.IOS 
While this proposal is not in itself a technique for guiding land 
use, it can be categorized under the heading of public acquisition 
of rights inasmuch as it would force the public to acquire certain 
rights whenever regulation severely reduced the value of land to its 
owner. It is, in a sense, the companion to Bosselmann's compen-
sated regulation plan. In practice, suspecting that its action would 
lead to an inverse condemnation action by the landowner involved, 
the government would actually take the property under a simplified 
eminent domain procedure, attach such covenants as it deemed to 
be in the public interest, auction the restricted parcel to private 
buyers, afford the initial landowner the right of first refusal at the 
auction price, and absorb the difference between the acquisition 
price and the auction price as the market-determined cost of the 
regulation to the public. 
E. Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) 
The idea of development rights that may be transferred from a 
parcel in an area where development cannot be accomodated or 
should not be allowed, to a parcel elsewhere where development is 
not objectionable, has received a sudden wave of attention. Like 
zoning, TDR plans require very careful planning by the governmen-
tal body. But unlike zoning, TDR plans do not merely extinguish 
value in some parcels and create it in others; they effect a transfer 
of development rights from the "losers" to the "winners" at the 
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expense of the winners. 106 
Legislation sponsored in Maryland by Senator William Goodman 
describes one of the numerous applications of the idea. lo7 Under it, 
the county governments would make essentially two decisions: (1) 
determining the total amount of development that can be accomo-
dated, given the present and expected future public infrastructure; 
(2) publishing a schedule of relative weights of various types of 
development-houses, apartments, shopping· centers, office build-
ings, etc. 
Initially, TDR units would be apportioned to all undeveloped 
land in the county on a per acre basis. No ten acre parcel would have 
enough rights from the distribution to allow its owner to construct 
a ten acre shopping center. To obtain the requisite number of rights, 
the developer would seek out landowners in sparsely developed 
areas of the county and offer to purchase the TDR units attached 
to their parcel. When sufficient TDR units are accumulated, the 
shopping center may be built. At the same time, the landowners 
who sold their TDR units to the developer will no longer have the 
right to develop their property, but they will have been compen-
sated by the developer for giving up their valuable right to develop. 
The TDR system has several advantages over ordinary zoning. 
Because the government is not required to specify zones in which 
certain activities may be undertaken, there is no incentive for devel-
opers and iandowners to corrupt the zoning process, i.e., finagle an 
upzoning to their benefit. The "windfall-wipeout" problem is elimi-
nated; the "externalities loop" can be closed; and the public can 
recoup some of the values in land created by public actions. lOS There 
is no extinguishing of land values by fiat as in zoning. One of the 
open questions debated by TDR advocates, however, is whether the 
governmental decisions should be limited to defining the overall 
capacity for development and the schedule of rights required, or 
whether the TDR scheme should be employed in conjunction with 
a more conventional zoning ordinance. 
A rural version of a TDR scheme has been adopted in Southamp-
tion, Long Island, New York. lOu There, a farm owner is allowed to 
concentrate all the development rights of his land onto a small 
segment of it. The farmer can then arrange to develop this small 
segment at high density, or transfer the rights to others. The farm-
land from which the TDRs were taken is, of course, then taxed at 
use value for farming only. The farmer is compensated for his loss 
of development rights on the farmland by the increased value of the 
portion of land on which the TDRs are concentrated. 
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F. Taxation Devices 
Taxation has long been recognized as an important influence in 
shaping economic decisions. Perhaps the most famous apostle of 
harnessing tax policy to land use and development was Henry 
George. In his enormously influential work PROGRESS AND POVERTY, 
published in 1879, George advocated the abolition of all taxes save 
that upon land values; i.e., to appropriate rent by taxation yo The 
result, he was convinced, would be that the single tax on land would 
either force owners to improve it, or sell it to others who would. This 
would, in George's view, stimulate a great productive boom by mak-
ing it impossible for landowners to hold their land out of production. 
Henry George's plan has never enjoyed widespread acceptance or 
application in the United States. 11I Nonetheless it suggests a means 
for encouraging concentrated development in some areas and no 
development in others, one of the goals commonly sought by police 
power controls over land use. Assuming state constitutions permit-
ted the differential taxation, a plan could be devised which placed 
heavy taxes on land in urban centers, but very little or none on 
improvements. In rural and natural resource areas, the reverse 
would be true: there would be very heavy taxation of other than 
agricultural improvements, and very low taxation on land itself. In 
between there could be intermediate zones with differing propor-
tions. 
There is little doubt that such a scheme would have a drastic 
effect on land use in a very short time. Indeed, for the first year or 
two it would certainly be a real estate broker's dream. The most 
serious drawback is probably that of completely altering the expec-
tations of millions of private landowners by switching over to the 
new system. Once transitional problems were accomodated, how-
ever, the scheme along these lines might have most interesting 
consequences. 112 
Professor Gordon MacDonald of Dartmouth College, an original 
appointee to the Council on Environmental Quality, has developed 
a plan for a system of user charges, in effect taxes, to discourage 
land uses thought by the public to be harmful. II3 The tax would be 
based on the difference between the use priority established by the 
government and the actual use. "If an industry wishes to locate on 
a wetland, it should be allowed to do so, provided that it is charged 
to an extent commensurate to the total cost to society of that 
use-on an annual basis, the cost to fisheries, wildlife, recreation, 
and so on .... Unlike the property tax, the user charge would not 
be a means of raising revenue but rather a way of employing the 
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market mechanism to influence land use decisions."114 Interestingly, 
Professor MacDonald told the Senate Interior Affairs Committee in 
1973 that he had reversed his earlier support of Senator Jackson's 
land use bill as a result of his study of the workings of nearby 
Vermont's environmental controllawsYs 
MacDonald's plan as presented contains a full complement of 
zoning and coercion by the state, although it backs off from the idea 
that the state should assume all power over the use and exchange 
of land. There would appear to be no reason why MacDonald's ideas 
could not be adapted to a setting more congenial to free market 
thinkers like Siegan and Ellickson. 
G. Public Investment Controls 
Public investment decisions have the dual virtue of having an 
enormous effect on private development decisions, and avoiding a 
coercive effect on private property. In a society which has generally 
socialized highways, water and sewer systems, police and fire pro-
tection, and education, and which has virtually socialized electric 
power generation, transmission and distribution, and air and rail 
transport through rigid regulation, existing control by the public 
over these activities offers a shining opportunity for shaping growth 
decisions. Indeed, one of the most avid state land use controllers in 
Vermont, ,the Cabinet-level Secretary of Environmental Conserva-
tion, observed in a relatively calm moment that the state could 
virtually control development with well-designed controls over pub-
lic investment of state funds. 116 
In November, 1973, the House Committee on Public Works 
opened a pioneering series of hearings on "A National Public Works 
Investment Policy: A Strategy for Balanced Population Growth and 
Economic Development."117 While the difficulty in coordinating 
public investment policies at Federal, state, and local levels poses 
a major obstacle to efficiency, this approach to guiding development 
is both potent in its impact and beyond the criticism of those who 
regard freehold property as a necessary underpinning of individual 
liberty and a republican form of government. 
IV. A PROPER FEDERAL ROLE 
If a Federal-state program along the lines of the proposed Land 
Use Planning Act is found to be undesirable, what should be the role 
of the federal government in guiding land use planning and national 
growth? In the author's view, the Federal Government could per-
form useful services in the following ways. 
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First, it could undertake detailed legal and economic research on 
the many questions posed by alternative techniques for guiding 
growth. Much of this it has already done, although not in a particu-
larly well coordinated way. A coordinated research and dissemina-
tion program, perhaps along the lines of the National Science Foun-
dation's "Research Applied to National Needs" (RANN) pro-
gram,1I8 would be extremely desirable. Research is presently being 
conducted or sponsored by the National Science Foundation, De-
partment of Agriculture, Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection 
Agency, and Department of Interior, just to name a few from what 
is no doubt an imposing list. The products of this research program 
should be disseminated widely among state and local governments, 
regional planning commissions, professional associations, and the 
interested public through publications and conferences. 
In doing so, however, it is important that the lead agency ap-
proach the subject in a true spirit of dispassionate analysis, rather 
than as a campaign of propagandizing for its own policies and orga-
nizing pressure directed toward the Congress. For example, the re-
search program should devote considerable attention to analysis of 
the role of government in causing senseless and costly misalloca-
tions of land through misguided public policies and their implemen-
tation. In an age where government research ranges from the sweat 
of aborigines to ancient Polish social customs to the sex life of the 
cabbage, it is remarkable that so little attention has been given to 
the frequently maligned role of government itself in causing na-
tional problems. On second thought, however, perhaps it is not so 
remarkable. 
Second, the Federal government should continue to underwrite 
costs and absorb risks in a number of selected experiments in guid-
ing land use and growth. States are reluctant to invest in research 
and development in any area, and the proposal to embark on an 
innovative test program in land use controls might well evoke a less 
than enthusiastic response from the legislature. The $500,000 sup-
port by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the 
"Rockingham Plan" developed by the Vermont Department of 
Budget and Management is an example of wise use of Federal 
funds. 1I9 The results of these various experiments must, of course, 
be carefully analyzed and discussed with policy makers in other 
jurisdictions and the general public. 
Third, the Federal government should continue to explore the 
potential of Federal public investment in shaping national growth 
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and development. As noted before, the Congress has already made 
a significant beginning. The Agriculture Act of 1970 required the 
President to report to Congress annually on the efforts of the execu-
tive branch to spur development in rural areas. l20 The same act also 
requires the President to report to Congress on the location of new 
Federal offices and other facilities. 121 The Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Act of 1970 required the President to transmit to Congress 
a biennial report on national growth.122 These as yet uncoordinated 
efforts have nonetheless established a base for a Federal public in-
vestment policy. 
Finally, if the Congress is determined to entice the states further 
into the land use field, Congress could adopt a special revenue-
sharing measure. Unlike the Land Use Planning Act, such a bill 
would merely provide Federal funds for State and local activities 
designed to guide land use decisions. 123 It would omit the exhaustive 
list of criteria and instructions of the Jackson and Udall bills, leav-
ing the shape of the state and local program to be determined by 
the people of those jurisdictions through their own governmental 
processes. No doubt in many jurisdictions the result would be state-
wide land use controls. In some enlightened states, where shapers 
of public policy entertain a balanced and thoughtful respect for a 
host of social, political, historical, economic and environmental val-
ues instead of a consuming desire to enthrone the theory of social 
property triumphant, wise and intelligent policies might emerge to 
serve as an example to other states, a frequently hoped for but rarely 
achieved reversal of Gresham's moumfullaw. 
-.~.>-.­
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